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ACADEMIC TENURE: ITS HISTORICAL AND LEGAL MEANINGS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
COMPENSATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL FACULTY MEMBERS 
LAWRENCE WHITE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the last ten years, America’s medical schools have endured an 
economic earthquake of almost unimaginable proportions.  In 1992, 
Georgetown University Law Professor Gregory Bloche identified and 
described what he called “the developing financial squeeze on academic 
medical centers,” attributing it to stinginess in federal health-care 
reimbursement policy, the then-nascent (now largely realized) revolution in 
third-party payment for clinical care, and the resulting reduction in cross-
subsidies that supported more than forty years of growth in teaching and 
research at American medical schools after the Second World War.1  Shortly 
 
* Program Officer, Pew Charitable Trusts, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and formerly University 
Counsel, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.  B.A., Harvard University (1971); J.D., 
University of Pennsylvania (1975).  The author wishes to thank the reference staffs at the Law 
School and Health Sciences Center Libraries at the University of New Mexico for generous 
research assistance provided during the preparation of this article.  He also wishes to thank 
Professor Jesse Goldner of the Saint Louis University School of Law and the staff of the SAINT 
LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL for their editorial assistance and encouragement.  The views 
expressed in this article belong to the author, and should not be attributed to the organizations at 
which he is currently or was formerly employed. 
 1. M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 SO. CAL. L. REV. 
1035, 1046-61 (1992).  For a perceptive treatment of the causes underlying the current financial 
difficulties confronting academic medical centers, see John. K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: 
Rapid Changes for Academic Medical Centers (Second of Two Parts), 332 N. ENG. J. MED. 407 
(1995). Mr. Iglehardt notes, for example, that: 
Despite their success, academic medical centers have surprisingly fragile economic 
foundations.  Their many missions are financed through a complex web of cross-
subsidies, because as a rule most functions – such as undergraduate and graduate medical 
education, biomedical research, and the treatment of severe or unusual diseases – do not 
pay for themselves. . . . As the system evolves to resemble a competitive marketplace 
more closely, . . . the ability of academic medical centers to continue financing their 
activities through cross-subsidies is problematic in the extreme.  The reason is that payers 
– employers, managed-care plans, and government, as well as patients – are placing more 
emphasis on reducing the rate of increase in medical expenditures. 
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after Professor Bloche’s article appeared, his warning of an impending 
financial crisis in academic medicine became suddenly and palpably real.  By 
1996, according to the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), 
twenty percent of the nation’s teaching hospitals were losing money, some at 
prodigious rates.2  As the decade drew to an end, at least two prominent 
academic medical centers reported operating losses of more than $75 million 
annually.3  Another academic medical center declared bankruptcy in 1998, 
threatening the closure of major urban teaching hospitals and the loss of 
thousands of health care jobs.4 
In an effort to cope with economic hard times, academic medical centers 
are struggling to become more entrepreneurial.  They are forging alliances with 
hospital systems perceived to be more adept at providing (and marketing) 
 
Id. at 407 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  See also David Blumenthal & Gregg S. Meyer, 
The Future of the Academic Medical Center Under Health Care Reform, 329 N. ENG. J. MED. 
1812 (1993). 
 2. Martin Van Der Werf, Changing Economics of Health Care Are Devastating Academic 
Medical Centers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 21, 1999, at A38, A38-A39. 
 3. Id. at A38 (stating that the University of Pennsylvania Health Services System lost 
nearly $90 million last year, while Georgetown University Medical Center has lost almost $120 
million in the past two years). 
 4. See Big Pennsylvania Health System to File Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1998, at 
B7.  The AAMC predicts that in the next three years the number of academic medical centers 
with annual operating deficits will approach fifty percent of the total.  One recently enacted 
federal statute – the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which reduces Medicare payments to hospitals 
– will result in the loss of almost $15 billion in Medicare reimbursements to the nation’s teaching 
hospitals in the five-year period between 1997 and 2002.  See Van Der Werf, supra note 2, at 
A38. 
  No organization has done a more diligent job of chronicling the worsening economic 
plight of academic medicine or the reasons for it than the AAMC, the professional assembly of 
American and Canadian academic medical centers.  Through its official monthly journal 
ACADEMIC MEDICINE, the AAMC regularly commissions and publishes thoughtful articles on the 
effects managed care and other market forces are having on medical school governance, the 
financial management of academic medical centers, faculty compensation policies, and faculty 
tenure policies.  See, e.g., Robert F. Jones & Jennifer S. Gold, AAMC Paper–Faculty 
Appointment and Tenure Policies in Medical Schools: A 1997 Status Report, 73 ACAD. MED. 211 
(1998); Paul F. Griner & David Blumenthal, AAMC Paper–Reforming the Structure and 
Management of Academic Medical Centers: Case Studies of Ten Institutions, 73 ACAD. MED. 818 
(1998). 
  In 1997, the AAMC, supported by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
created the “Forum on the Future of Academic Medicine” (“Forum”) providing focused 
assistance to university and medical school leaders in coping with market-driven changes in 
clinical care.  John Iglehart’s reports on the Forum’s deliberations are published in ACADEMIC 
MEDICINE and, as the names of the papers suggest, usefully summarize causes and effects.  
Session I–Setting the Stage, 72 ACAD. MED. 595 (1997); Session II–Finances and Culture, 72 
ACAD. MED. 754 (1997); Session III–Getting from Here to There, 73 ACAD. MED. 146 (1998); 
Session IV–The Realities of the Health Care Environment, 73 ACAD. MED. 956 (1998); Session 
V–Implications of Basic and Applied Research for AMCs, 73 ACAD. MED. 1241 (1998). 
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clinical services without losing money.5  Not surprisingly, “[t]he rise of cost 
consciousness,” to use Professor Bloche’s felicitous phrase,6 has surfaced 
tensions between medical school faculty members and a new generation of 
bottom-line-oriented clinical administrators.  Faculty fear that academic 
medical centers will retreat from traditional academic values, while 
administrators decry, in tones of increasing urgency, the perceived 
irresponsibility of long-term commitments to teaching and research in an era of 
unprecedented financial volatility.7 
The tension is visibly manifested in fundamental disputes over the 
meaning of faculty tenure in contemporary academic medicine.  In 1995, 
AAMC President Dr. Jordan Cohen warned of the cultural disharmony 
between medical school administrators and tenured medical school faculty 
members: 
The existence of tenure in medical schools represents a linkage to the broader 
academic culture of the university, with its traditional devotion to a free 
exchange of ideas without threat of economic penalty. Yet, medical schools, 
because of their increased involvement in the real world of health care 
delivery, are also linked to the corporate culture, with its brutal devotion to 
productivity without guarantees of economic security.  The clash of these 
cultures is reaching deafening proportions and will challenge the most adroit 
academic administrators.  If medical schools are to succeed, they must avoid 
the Scylla of an ivory-tower disregard of new competitive realities and the 
Charybdis of a corporate sellout of academic values.8 
In the mid-1990s, academic medical centers, with varying degrees of buy-
in from their faculties, began wide-ranging examinations of their faculty 
compensation policies.  The AAMC convened two well-attended conferences 
on faculty tenure and compensation issues, including one in 1997 with the 
provocative title Legal Issues in Faculty Tenure and Compensation.9  By that 
 
 5. See Van Der Werf, supra note 2, at A39 (noting Tenet Health Care Corporation’s recent 
purchase of St. Louis University Medical Center and Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation’s 
eighty percent acquisition of Tulane Hospital). 
 6. Bloche, supra note 1, at 1052. 
 7. See Michael K. Magill et al., Cultures in Conflict: A Challenge to Faculty of Academic 
Health Centers, 73 ACAD. MED. 871, 872-73 (1998). 
 8. Jordan J. Cohen M.D., Academic Medicine’s Tenuous Hold on Tenure, 70 ACAD. MED. 
294 (1995). 
 9. The two conferences were: TENURE, COMPENSATION, AND CAREER PATHWAYS: 
REEXAMINING THE FACULTY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ACADEMIC MEDICINE (1996), 
featuring useful papers by former University of Virginia President Robert M. O’Neil 
(“Reexamining the Meaning and Role of Tenure in Academic Medicine”) and Steven G. Olswang 
(“Academic Freedom and Tenure: The United States and United Kingdom Experience”); and 
LEGAL ISSUES IN FACULTY TENURE AND COMPENSATION (1997), featuring presentations by four 
attorneys on legal issues involving academic medical center faculty, including compensation, 
termination for cause, post-tenure review, and related subjects.  These AAMC conference 
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year, many academic medical centers had adopted new compensation 
paradigms under which a portion but not all of a tenured faculty member’s 
annual salary was explicitly protected against reduction – the implication being 
that institutions were free to effect salary reductions for tenured faculty 
members as long as adjusted salaries did not go below protected “floors.”10  
Predictably, institutional policymaking in an area as sensitive as faculty 
compensation triggered expressions of alarm from many faculty members. 
Under what circumstances (if any) and in accordance with what procedures 
can medical schools respond to budget deficits by adopting compensation 
policies that allow for reductions in the compensation of tenured faculty 
members?  This question has already triggered grievances and litigation at 
several medical schools.11  It is the postulate of this article that differences 
between faculty members and administrators over tenure and faculty 
compensation arise in part from lack of precision about the meaning of tenure 
and its historical and legal relationship to compensation.  The purpose of this 
article is to limn the history of academic tenure in the United States – a history 
of surprising brevity and some ambiguity – and explain in light of that history 
what tenure means as a defining characteristic of higher education in this 
country and as a legal term in litigation over faculty compensation. 
Part II of this article explores the historic antecedents of the modern 
concept of academic tenure.  For at least three-quarters of a century, tenure has 
been justified on two independent grounds: as the surest way to safeguard the 
academic freedom of faculty members, and as a means of ensuring “economic 
security” for the professoriate.  For most of that time, little attention was given 
to the latter justification.  It is only in the last three years – literally – that the 
American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) and other 
thoughtful proponents of tenure have resurrected the “economic security” basis 
for tenure and sought to ascribe a meaning to that term; and it is only in the last 
three years that faculty litigants have advanced the theory that alterations in an 
institution’s policies governing faculty compensation threaten the faculty’s 
“economic security,” hence tenure itself. 
Part III examines the contemporary meaning of academic tenure.  It 
enumerates the procedural protections that attach, as a matter of contract law, 
when tenure is bestowed on a faculty member, and describes the circumstances 
– substantive and procedural – under which the employing institution of higher 
 
materials are particularly useful to those who wish to explore the relationship between academic 
tenure and faculty compensation policies.  Copies of conference materials can be obtained from 
Dr. Robert F. Jones, Associate Vice President, Section for Institutional and Faculty Policy 
Studies, AAMC, 2450 N Street, N.W., Room 411, Washington, D.C. 20037, or from the AAMC 
at <http://www.aamc.org>. 
 10. For illustrations of policies incorporating so-called “X-Y-Z” compensation formulae, see 
Jones & Gold, supra note 4, at 217-18. 
 11. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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education can terminate a tenured faculty appointment.  Part III concludes by 
examining the AAUP report entitled Tenure in the Medical School.12  
Published in 1996, this report was of path-breaking importance in that it 
represented the first sustained attempt to give content to the term “economic 
security” and to delineate the parameters of a medical school’s ability, 
consistent with tenure, to modify compensation policies for tenured faculty. 
Finally, Part IV summarizes the modest amount of litigation that has been 
spawned by salary reductions affecting tenured faculty members.  In the last 
two years, the number of lawsuits brought by tenured medical school faculty 
members has slowly grown, and it is not too early to draw some conclusions 
about judicial reactions to the argument by faculty members that the 
“economic security” dimension of tenure protects them against changes in 
compensation policies occasioned by financial distress at the medical schools 
in which they are employed.  As we shall see, courts have so far been resistant 
to that argument. 
II. AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF ACADEMIC TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES13 
Tenure and the associated concept of hierarchical academic rank, including 
untenured instructors, untenured assistant professors, tenured associate 
professors, and tenured full professors, are relatively new phenomena in 
American higher education.  The privately-supported, predominantly sectarian 
institutions of higher education founded in this country in the seventeenth, 
 
 12. Tenure in the Medical School, 82 ACADEME 40 (Jan.-Feb. 1996) (prepared by 
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, American Association of University 
Professors).  ACADEME is the official publication of the AAUP. 
 13. It is impossible to write about the history of academic tenure in this country without 
borrowing heavily from the work of Professor Walter Metzger, the subject’s preeminent 
authority.  Although more than a quarter of a century old, Professor Metzger’s 1973 essay 
Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay remains the best starting point for serious 
scholarship on the subject.  See Walter Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical 
Essay, in COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE 93 
(1973) [hereinafter Metzger, Academic Tenure].  For those desiring an extended treatment of the 
topics covered in Professor Metzger’s article, see ROBERT HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955) [hereinafter 
HOFSTADTER & METZGER].  Published as part of Columbia University’s “American Academic 
Freedom Project,” this 527-page treatise comprehensively surveys the history of academic 
freedom and its relationship to academic tenure at American colleges and universities. Part I, 
written by Professor Hofstadter, focuses on what the authors call “the prehistory of academic 
freedom in our own country” from the founding of Harvard College in 1636 to the end of the 
Civil War.  See id. at 78-113.  Part II, written by Professor Metzger, see id. at 275-506, chronicles 
the coming of the modern university and the development of “[a] self-conscious and well-
formulated rationale for academic freedom” based on freedoms asserted by faculty and students 
in the great German universities of that epoch. See id. at xii.  Like other authors who precede me 
in exploring the history of academic tenure in the United States, I gratefully acknowledge 
Professor Metzger’s contributions, reflected in what follows. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
56 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:51 
eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries used governance structures and 
instructional methods derived in large measure from Oxford and Cambridge 
Universities, the institutions from which most of the colony’s educators had 
graduated.14  Governance was the responsibility of self-perpetuating boards of 
“fellows,” who in turn appointed “tutors” to perform the mundane task of 
instructing students in class.15  Until the middle of the eighteenth century, there 
was no rank higher than “tutor” on most American college faculties.16  Tutors 
were appointed for short fixed terms, with no guaranteed right to 
reappointment for successive terms.17 
Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, colleges used gifts from 
merchants and wealthy graduates to establish endowed chairs, and chairholders 
were given an exalted title new to American institutions: professor.18  In 
deliberate contrast to the lowly tutors, professorial appointments were without 
limit of time, although governing boards could terminate professors for 
inadequate performance of duty or misconduct.19 
A. The Forces that Shaped Modern Academic Tenure 
For much of the eighteenth century, tenure was defined more by what it 
was not than by what it actually signified.  Eighteenth-century tutors were 
ordinarily engaged under short “term” appointments, and were required to 
stand for reappointment every two or three years.20  In contrast, bequests 
establishing new professorships frequently fixed the appointment “durante 
vita” -- for the life of the incumbent.21  Professors were freed from the 
obligation to apply for reappointment at periodic intervals, although, as 
historians observed, this was far from tenure in the modern sense given the 
ease with which professors could be dismissed by governing boards for the 
most inconsequential of reasons.22 
 
 14. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 114-16. 
 15. Id. at 110-11. 
 16. Id. at 120. 
 17. For a lively description of higher education in colonial America, see id. at 114-51.  See 
generally LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (1965); 
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD 1636-1936 (1936). 
 18. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 120. 
 19. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 230. 
 20. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 21. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 120. 
 22. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 230 (noting that “[a]lthough a professor 
usually held office indefinitely on good behavior, his tenure depended upon usage and had no 
legal status” thus, “he could be fired at will by the governing board . . . [sometimes without] a 
hearing.”). 
  Tenured faculty members who challenged their dismissals in court were singularly 
unsuccessful in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Typical of the judicial rhetoric 
of that era was the dismissive decision of Hartigan v. Board of Regents of West Virginia 
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The modern concept of academic tenure owes its existence to three great 
shaping events of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: exposure of 
American educators to the German university and the German concept of 
lehrfreiheit, loosely translated as a faculty member’s academic freedom as a 
teacher and researcher; enactment of the Morrill Act in 1862; and a series of 
path-breaking court cases decided a century ago known collectively as the 
“Economics” cases. 
1. The German Influence 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, American colleges were 
overwhelmingly sectarian.  Their mission was to produce clergymen, and their 
method of instruction was primarily rote memorization.23  Faculty did little 
original research, and scarcely imagined their mission to include training in 
scholarship.24  But in the nineteenth century, more than nine thousand 
Americans studied in what were at that time the world’s preeminent research 
universities, the universities of Germany, and many of them joined the 
teaching ranks when they completed their studies and returned to the United 
States.25  While overseas, they discovered colleagues who envisioned their jobs 
as members of university faculties quite differently, due in part to the German 
concept of lehrfreiheit.  “By lehrfreiheit,” wrote Professors Hofstadter and 
Metzger, “the German educator meant two things [:]” 
He meant that the university professor was free to examine bodies of evidence 
and to report his findings in lecture or published form -- that he enjoyed 
freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry . . . . This freedom was not, as the 
Germans conceived it, an inalienable endowment of all men, nor was it the 
superadded attraction of certain universities and not of others; rather, it was the 
 
University, 38 S.E. 698 (W. Va. 1901).  Hartigan involved a university president who asked the 
board of regents to terminate the appointment of an anatomy professor who had served on the 
faculty for thirteen years.  The president accused the professor of being “untruthful [and] 
unscientific” and of being “wasteful of the university property committed to his charge . . . .”  Id. 
at 706 (Dent, J., dissenting). The board ordered that the university terminate the professor’s 
appointment without notice.  When the professor sought a writ of prohibition restraining the 
board from carrying out its order, the court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to review actions by 
governing boards affecting the employment of faculty members: “Some one will ask, is the board 
of regents to do as it pleases, without control, erroneous as its actions may be?  Yes, so far as the 
courts are concerned.”  Id. at 700. 
  Other nineteenth century courts were hostile to faculty members in cases involving 
terminations of long-term appointments.  See, e.g., Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schs., 
58 N.W. 1042 (Wis. 1894); Devol v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ariz., 56 P. 737 (Ariz. 1899); 
Ward v. Board of Regents of Kan. State Agric. College, 138 Fed. 372 (8th Cir. 1905); Darrow v. 
Briggs, 169 S.W. 118 (Mo. 1914). 
 23. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 229. 
 24. Id. at 369. 
 25. Id. at 367. 
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distinctive prerogative of the academic profession, and the essential condition 
of all universities.  In addition, lehrfreiheit . . . also denoted the paucity of 
administrative rules within the teaching situation: the absence of a prescribed 
syllabus, the freedom from tutorial duties, the opportunity to lecture on any 
subject according to the teacher’s interest.  Thus, academic freedom, as the 
Germans defined it, was not simply the right of professors to speak without 
fear or favor, but the atmosphere of consent that surrounded the whole process 
of research and instruction.26 
Exposure to German academic governance opened the eyes of the 
American professoriate to the hitherto radical notion that academic freedom 
protected faculty members from the very powers that were responsible for their 
appointment and continued employment: trustees and administrators.  In a 
florid passage from his 1869 inaugural address as President of Harvard 
University, Charles W. Eliot extolled freedom from institutional interference as 
the quintessential faculty right: 
A university must, . . . above all, . . . be free.  The winnowing breeze of 
freedom must blow through all its chambers.  It takes a hurricane to blow 
wheat away.  An atmosphere of intellectual freedom is the native air of 
literature and science.  This university . . . demands of all its teachers that they 
be grave, reverent and high-minded; but it leaves them, like their pupils, free.27 
In 1876, the Johns Hopkins University was founded as the first American 
institution offering graduate education on the German model.28  The avowedly 
nonsectarian universities that opened their doors at the end of the century – 
Chicago and Stanford foremost among them – hired faculty members who 
were expected for the first time to engage in rigorous research.29  As curricular 
 
 26. Id. at 386-87.  See Walter P. Metzger, The German Contribution to the American Theory 
of Academic Freedom, in THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN FORMATION: A 
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND REPORTS 215 (Walter P. Metzger ed., 1977). 
  Professors Hofstadter and Metzger reproduce correspondence exchanged in 1815 
between the man who was soon to be the first president of the University of Virginia, Thomas 
Jefferson, and a young Harvard faculty member named George Ticknor whom Jefferson hoped to 
lure away to his new university.  After Ticknor visited the University of Gottingen, he wrote to 
Jefferson: 
No matter what a man thinks, he may teach it and print it; not only without molestation 
from the government but also without molestation from publick [sic] opinion . . . . If truth 
is to be attained by freedom of inquiry, as I doubt not it is, the German professors and 
literati are certainly on the high road, and have the way quietly open before them. 
HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 391. 
 27. Id. at 394 (emphasis added). 
 28. DONALD KENNEDY, ACADEMIC DUTY 26 (1997).  Of the fifty-three Hopkins faculty 
members when the university was first established, nearly all had studied at German universities.  
They adopted the German method of instruction, relying on lectures, seminars, and laboratories.  
So profound was the German influence on pedagogy at Hopkins that the new university was 
called “Göttingen at Baltimore.”  HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 377. 
 29. KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 26-27. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] ACADEMIC TENURE 59 
boundaries expanded, so did the potential for ideological friction between 
faculty and trustees – and so did the perceived need for procedures to protect 
the academic freedom of faculty members. 
2. The Morrill Act 
The Morrill Act expanded and democratized American higher education in 
the years after the Civil War by making public lands available for the 
establishment of so-called “land-grant colleges.”30  Impetus behind the Morrill 
Act began with the great London and New York expositions of the 1850s, 
which showcased the scientific and technological advances of the Industrial 
Revolution and persuaded a generation of American educators that the 
standard curriculum of the day was “hopelessly antiquated.”31 The Morrill Act 
gave to every state that remained in the Union a minimum grant of 90,000 
acres of public land to establish colleges dedicated to engineering, agriculture, 
mechanical arts, and vocational training.32  Subsequent legislation, enacted in 
1890, extended the land-grant college program to the southern states that had 
seceded during the Civil War.33 
For our purposes, the significance of the land-grant college enactments lay 
in the large-scale increase of college and university faculty members in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, all of whom were state government 
employees who enjoyed defined employment rights under state law.  The land-
grant colleges, including the University of Wisconsin in the 1870s and Cornell 
University in the 1880s, divided professorial rank into three sub-ranks: 
assistant, associate, and full professor.34  These land-grant colleges also 
developed codified procedures governing advancement from one rank to the 
next.35  Additionally, most colleges and universities during this period adopted 
the notion of “probationary service” prior to advancement to a tenured rank, 
and the correlative “up or out” rule at the end of the probationary period.36 
3. The Celebrated “Economics” Cases 
Ideological turbulence roiled the economics profession at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, as traditional business-oriented departments of 
economics were challenged by a new generation of radical faculty members 
who espoused free trade, the abandonment of the gold standard, the regulation 
 
 30. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (which “apportion[ed] to each State a quantity 
[of public land] equal to thirty thousand acres for each senator and representative in Congress”). 
 31. ALLAN NEVINS, THE STATE UNIVERSITIES AND DEMOCRACY 2 (1962). 
 32. Morrill Act, 12 Stat. 503.  See also METZGER & HOFSTADTER, supra note 13, at 380-82. 
 33. See 26 Stat. 417 (1890) (giving funds from the sale of public lands to “each State and 
Territory for the more complete endowment and maintenance of colleges”). 
 34. Metzger, Faculty Tenure, supra note 13, at 123. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 121. 
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of monopolies, public ownership of utility companies, and other positions 
deemed heretical by the corporate magnates serving as trustees at most of the 
public and private institutions of the day.37  Not surprisingly, schisms 
developed within leading economics departments and between radical 
economists and conservative university presidents and trustees. 
Professors Hofstadter and Metzger brilliantly describe the origins of the 
ideological confrontations that repeatedly disrupted economics departments at 
major universities at the end of the nineteenth century.38  For the first time in 
the nation’s history, industrialists were making large fortunes and using them 
to support universities on an unprecedented scale.  “Inevitably,” Hofstadter and 
Metzger dryly observed, “the increase in the size of gifts changed the relations 
of donor and recipient.  Borrowing a term from economic history, one may say 
that the givers became entrepreneurs in the field of higher education.”39  Just as 
inevitably, enormous gifts were rewarded with appointments to institutional 
governing boards; “[t]hus, big businessmen and professors came into fateful 
contact.”40 
Economics departments proved to be a particularly combustible meeting 
place.  In 1901, the former President of Kansas State Agricultural College, 
Thomas Elmer Will, wrote that at least twelve faculty members from 
economics and political science departments had been removed from tenured 
positions in the preceding eight years for espousing “heretical social and 
economic writings” on such topics as the need to regulate monopolies, the 
advantages of free silver, the anti-democratic impulses of imperialism, and the 
need for immigration reform.41  The most notorious of these cases involved 
Edward A. Ross, a tenured professor of economics at Stanford University.  In 
 
 37. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 413. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 414. 
 40. Id. at 418.  Before the Civil War, the largest philanthropic gift ever given to an American 
college was Abbott Lawrence’s $50,000 gift to Harvard.  But in the 1880s, the estate of a 
California railroad magnate contributed $24 million to establish Stanford University; the founder 
of Standard Oil gave $34 million to the University of Chicago; and John D. Rockefeller 
contributed $46 million to establish a foundation called the General Education Board to provide 
financial support to secondary and postsecondary schools throughout the United States.  Id. at 
413-14. 
 41. Id. at 420-21.  President Will viewed the decade’s developments from a unique vantage 
point.  In the election of 1896, Republican Party majorities in both houses of the Kansas 
legislature were displaced by a coalition of Democrats and Populists, who immediately assumed 
control of the governing board of the state land-grant college.  All faculty contracts in the 
economics department were terminated, and Will, an advocate of reform and a friend of Populist 
legislators, was appointed to the presidency.  Two years later, the Republican Party returned to 
power.  Will was dismissed, a new president was installed, the appointments of all the new 
members of the economics department were terminated, and their places were filled with loyal 
Republicans.  Id. at 424-25. 
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1900, Stanford’s legendary President David Starr Jordan dismissed Professor 
Ross at the insistence of university trustee Jane Lathrop Stanford, the widow of 
the University’s founder, Leland Stanford.42  Mrs. Stanford’s well-connected 
industrialist friends were offended by Professor Ross’s unorthodox advocacy 
of populist economic policies.43  Because of Ross’s national prominence as 
secretary of the American Economic Association and the fledgling university’s 
academic aspirations, Ross’s firing captured the attention and imagination of 
the national media, who “seized upon the incident as a parable of the fate of 
liberal professors in institutions dominated by the moneyed class.”44 
Matters worsened in 1913, when another prominent economics professor, 
William Fisher, resigned from the Wesleyan University faculty at the 
insistence of the institution’s president.45  Professor Fisher’s offense was the 
off-campus delivery of a speech that advocated relaxing the rigid rules for the 
observance of the Sunday Sabbath.  Professor Fisher’s colleagues were 
outraged when they learned of the president’s action and the Economics 
Department chairman -- who had himself resigned in protest from the Stanford 
faculty in the wake of the Ross firing -- tried to organize a faculty boycott of 
the president’s efforts to hire a replacement for Professor Fisher.46  Other 
faculty members sought to interest the American Economic Association in 
conducting an investigation, but their effort yielded no published result 
because, as Professor Metzger tersely reports, “the chairman [of the 
investigating committee] became convinced that Fisher had not been faultless 
in conduct and because he wished to reserve full reportage for the worthy 
pure.”47 
These “Economics” cases offered an important lesson for thoughtful 
proponents of faculty rights.  The cases showed that presidents, trustees, and 
other powerful people who were opposed to the expression of unorthodox 
views and willing to use their power to suppress such expression could 
repeatedly threaten academic freedom.  By the beginning of the twentieth 
century leaders in the American academic community were tentatively 
beginning to draw the connection between two strands of thought -- one 
philosophical, one legal.  The German-inspired notion that a university could 
achieve greatness only by according faculty the unfettered right to determine 
for themselves what to teach and how to teach it became linked to the need for 
a codified system of procedural protections that would shield faculty members 
who exercised their academic freedom from the intemperate reactions of 
 
 42. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 138. 
 43. Id.  Ross campaigned for free silver, a ban on oriental immigration, municipal ownership 
of utilities, and public scrutiny of the Southern Pacific Railroad.  Id. 
 44. Id. at 139. 
 45. Id. at 146. 
 46. Id. at 147. 
 47. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 148. 
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administrators and trustees.  Professors Hofstadter and Metzger describe the 
moment these two strands first converged in a significant way, when Harvard’s 
venerated President Charles W. Eliot delivered the Phi Beta Kappa address at 
that institution’s commencement exercises in 1907.48  Invoking more than a 
decade’s turbulence in departments of economics at Harvard and other 
universities, Eliot focused his remarks on fractious relations between 
professors and lay boards of trustees: “[S]o long as . . . boards of trustees of 
colleges and universities claim the right to dismiss at pleasure all the officers 
of the institution in their charge, . . . there will be no security for the teachers’ 
proper freedom . . . .”49  Eliot’s statement was one of the first explicit links 
drawn between academic freedom as a defining characteristic of American 
higher education and protections afforded by tenure as a means of 
safeguarding academic positions against administrative encroachment. 
As originally conceived a century ago, academic tenure was a means to 
nurture and protect academic freedom.  Conspicuously absent from the rhetoric 
of that era was any reference to tenure as a way to enhance the economic 
stature of faculty members.  In fact, faculty members, if not wealthy, were 
comparatively well-to-do in pre-industrial America.  At the end of the 
nineteenth century, professors’ salaries were seventy-five percent higher than 
those of clerical workers; seventy-five percent higher than those of Methodist 
and Congregational ministers; significantly higher than the wages of social 
workers, librarians, journalists, and other categories of professionals; and three 
hundred percent higher than the wages of manual laborers.50  It was not until 
1915 and “[t]he addition of a new wealthy extreme” to American society in the 
form of industrialists, financiers, and others who earned fortunes in the years 
before the Great War that compensation first emerged as a faculty concern 
bearing a relationship to the justification for academic tenure.51 
B. The Founding of the American Association of University Professors 
In 1913 Arthur Lovejoy, a philosophy professor at the Johns Hopkins 
University, and seventeen other Hopkins professors circulated a letter to 
 
 48. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 398. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 466 n.181. 
 51. Professors Hofstadter and Metzger note: 
The addition of a new wealthy extreme to the range of classes in America seemed to 
depress and demote all the others.  Compared with the enormous returns that accrued to 
business, the professor’s emoluments seemed small.  Compared with the high adventure 
of finance and the epics of industrial derring-do, his existence seemed drab.  Compared 
with the honors heaped on the practical men, the distinctions accorded the thinking man 
seemed grudging and picayune.  The illusion of a paradise lost was viewed against a 
perceptual field of sharp contemporary social contrasts. 
Id. at 467. 
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colleagues at nine leading American universities urging them to support the 
formation of a national association of professors.  Six hundred professors 
accepted Professor Lovejoy’s invitation to become charter members of the new 
organization, christened the American Association of University Professors 
(“AAUP”).52 
Professor Lovejoy proposed two principal tasks for the new organization: 
(1) “the gradual formulation of general principles respecting the tenure of the 
professional office and the legitimate ground for the dismissal of professors,” 
and (2) the establishment of “a representative judicial committee to investigate 
and report in cases in which freedom is alleged to have been interfered with by 
the administrative authorities of any university . . . .”53  Professor Metzger 
captures the significance of Professor Lovejoy’s formulation of the AAUP’s 
two principal undertakings: 
The first proposal looked forward to tenure rules that would be shaped to the 
interest of professors rather than to the interest of lay controllers and that 
would be standardized for the entire nation rather than left to each campus 
ward. The second proposal, remarkable for its audacity, urged the organized 
professors to set themselves up as the judges of administrative conduct in all 
those tangled and bristling affairs that end in academic dismissals.  But it was 
in the joining of these two proposals that their historic significance can be said 
to lie.  For many years, professors had evidenced concern about their security 
of tenure. And for many years . . . professors had sought ‘academic freedom’ – 
immunity from institutional sanctions in matters of expression and belief.  
What was so unusual and worthy of mark was the marriage of these two 
concerns in one professional plan of action.54 
The AAUP’s first significant achievement was the formulation in 1915 of 
the General Declaration of Principles (“1915 General Declaration”).55 The 
1915 General Declaration was one of the first efforts to draw an explicit 
analytic connection between academic freedom as the defining characteristic of 
American higher education and tenure as the most effective means for 
preserving and protecting academic freedom.56  More important for our 
purposes, the 1915 General Declaration contributed another important strand 
to the development of academic tenure in the United States: the articulation of 
 
 52. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 138.  The founding of the AAUP is amply 
chronicled in essays, reports and books authored, in the main, by members of the AAUP’s 
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure.  See, e.g., Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic 
Freedom—Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1965), 
reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, at 242, 253 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967); 
HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 468-90. 
 53. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 135-36 (citation omitted). 
 54. Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
 55. See 1915 GENERAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC TENURE, reprinted in 
FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY 393 (William W. Van Alstyne ed., 1993). 
 56. Id. at 399, 405-06. 
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a link between academic tenure and faculty compensation.57  In a long passage, 
the 1915 General Declaration addressed, for the first time, the financial 
aspirations of university faculty members and offered a rationale for tenure as 
a substitute for wealth: 
If education is the corner stone of the structure of society and if progress in 
scientific knowledge is essential to civilization, few things can be more 
important than to enhance the dignity of the scholar’s profession, with a view 
of attracting into its ranks men of the highest ability . . . .  This is the more 
essential because the pecuniary emoluments of the profession are not, and 
doubtless never will be, equal to those open to the more successful members of 
other professions.  It is not, in our opinion, desirable that men should be drawn 
into this profession by the magnitude of the economic rewards which it offers; 
but it is for this reason the more needful that men of high gifts and character 
should be drawn into it by the assurance of an honorable and secure 
position . . . .58 
In 1925, the American Council on Education called a conference for the 
purpose of discussing the principles of academic freedom and tenure.59  
Representatives of the AAUP and other higher education organizations were 
invited to attend.  The conference’s tangible product was the 1925 statement 
from its Conference on Academic Freedom and Tenure (“1925 Conference 
Statement”), a document remarkable for two reasons: first, because it 
constituted an explicit endorsement by a body of college presidents of the 
principle that academic tenure is essential to safeguard the academic freedom 
of faculty members; and second, because it was the first effort to develop 
codified rules of fair procedure for the adjudication of tenure-related disputes 
by faculty bodies.60 
C. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
(“1940 Statement of Principles”) is widely accepted and widely cited as the 
most influential expression of tenure principles to be found anywhere in the 
 
 57. Id. at 397, 405-06. 
 58. Id. at 396 (emphasis added). 
 59. See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 26 (1990). 
 60. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 151-52.  The 1925 Conference Statement is 
reprinted in XI AAUP BULL. 99 (1925).  The 1925 Conference Statement was notable in another 
pertinent respect.  It was the first document to posit that “financial exigency” could serve under 
appropriate circumstances as a justification for terminating tenured appointments.  Although it 
did not define the term, it did provide that “[t]ermination of permanent or long-term appointments 
because of financial exigencies should be sought only as a last resort, after every effort has been 
made to meet the need in other ways and to find for the teacher other employment in the 
institution.”  XI AAUP BULL., at 101. 
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extensive literature on American higher education.61  Elaborating on themes 
tentatively expressed in the 1915 General Declaration and 1925 Conference 
Statement, the 1940 Statement of Principles explains tenure’s central purposes: 
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically (1) freedom of teaching and 
research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic 
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability.  
Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the 
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to 
society.62 
Here, in a form more succinct than in the 1915 General Declaration, the 
AAUP drew a direct analytic connection between tenure and faculty 
compensation.63  As we shall see, however, it was not until the mid-1990s that 
the AAUP endeavored to give any content to the “economic security” language 
in the 1940 Statement of Principles. 
III. TENURE AS A CONTRACTUAL CONCEPT 
A. The Contractual Meaning of Academic Tenure. 
Tenure is a contractually enforceable institutional promise relating to the 
duration of a faculty appointment.64  As past AAUP General Counsel William 
Van Alstyne notes: 
Tenure, accurately and unequivocally defined, lays no claim whatever to a 
guarantee of lifetime employment.  Rather, tenure provides only that no person 
 
 61. The definitive history of the 1940 Statement of Principles was written in 1990, on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles’ adoption, by none other than Professor 
Walter Metzger.  See Metzger, supra note 59, at 3.  For other treatments of the central role of the 
1940 Statement of Principles in the history and development of academic freedom and tenure in 
the United States, see Matthew W. Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of Private Higher 
Education, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1119, 1150-51 (1980) (noting that “[t]he 1940 Statement . . . has 
become so widely accepted throughout American higher education that it has achieved judicial 
recognition as a usage of the profession”); HARRY T. EDWARDS & VIRGINIA DAVIS NORDIN, 
HIGHER EDUCATION & THE LAW 218 (1979) (“[t]he definition of tenure which is most prevalent 
in American higher education is found in the 1940 Statement of Principles”). 
 62. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (1995) 
[hereinafter AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS].  This compendium, commonly called the 
“Redbook,” encompasses the full range of AAUP policy statements, from the 1940 Statement of 
Principles to detailed implementing policies on governance, professional ethics, discrimination, 
student rights, fringe benefits, and many other subjects.  The volume includes a good index, a 
bibliography and useful essays explaining how the AAUP adopts policies and how AAUP 
policies are interpreted and applied by the courts. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation and “Defense,” 57 AAUP 
BULL. 328, 328 (1971). 
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continuously retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified lengthy 
period of probationary service may thereafter be dismissed without adequate 
cause . . . . [T]enure is translatable principally as a statement of formal 
assurance that . . . the individual’s professional security and academic freedom 
will not be placed in question without the observance of full academic due 
process.65 
In accordance with the law of contracts, tenure means two things.  First 
and most important, a tenured appointment has no specified end date and is 
therefore an appointment of indefinite term.  Second, a tenured appointment 
can be terminated only for reasons and only in accordance with procedures 
that are specified as part of the contract and understood by the parties at the 
time they enter into the employment relationship.66 
 The contract rights of faculty members are defined in many places, the 
most significant of which are: 
 The institution’s governing documents (charter, bylaws, state statutes, 
institutional regulations, and so forth); 
 The faculty handbook; and 
 The faculty member’s individual employment contract or 
appointment letter.67 
Tenure exists at a particular institution only if it is identified in the 
governing documents, the handbook, or elsewhere as a contract right belonging 
to eligible faculty members.  Individual institutions are free to depart from 
traditional notions of academic tenure, and even to do away with tenure 
altogether.  In fact, however, tenure is virtually universal in American colleges 
 
 65. Id. at 328 (emphasis added). 
 66. See Ronald C. Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6 J.L. & 
EDUC. 279, 280 (1977) (“[t]he legal effect of a tenure system is to place restrictions on the power 
of the employing institution to terminate tenured professors except for cause and after a 
hearing”); American Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 322 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (“[a]lthough academic tenure does not constitute a guarantee of life 
employment . . . it denotes clearly defined limitations upon the institution’s power to terminate 
the teacher’s services”), aff’d, 346 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
 67. See Brown, supra note 66, at 281 (noting that “[q]uite commonly the authority to grant 
tenure may be found in a comprehensive statutory scheme which provides the right to continued 
employment subject only to removal in a prescribed manner for enumerated causes”);  see also id. 
at 282-84 (discussing the incorporation of handbook provisions into the tenure contract and other 
sources of contractual rights).  At most institutions, the handbook contains detailed definitions of 
faculty ranks; prescribes the procedure by which faculty members are appointed, promoted, and 
given tenure; establishes a maximum probationary period; and describes both the standards the 
institution will employ to determine whether a tenured faculty appointment (or a non-tenured 
appointment during the term of the appointment) should be terminated and the procedures to be 
used in effecting that decision. 
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and universities, and more than ninety-five percent of North American medical 
schools have formal tenure systems for their faculty.68 
What does it mean to say that tenure is a contractual concept?  It means, 
simply, that the tenure provisions in the institution’s faculty handbook and 
tenure policies rise to the level of contractually enforceable institutional 
promises that (1) cannot be modified unilaterally by the institution, and (2) can 
give rise to pecuniary damage claims against the institution if they are 
breached or not observed.  Phrased more formally, the inclusion of tenure 
provisions in a faculty handbook or institutional policy will usually be 
construed by a reviewing court as an abrogation of the traditional common-law 
“employment at will” doctrine.  As the courts have held in a series of cases 
over the last two decades, the tenure terms in faculty handbooks and 
institutional policies become part of the employment contract between faculty 
member and institution, regardless of whether or not they are incorporated by 
specific reference in the individual faculty member’s appointment letter.69 
The AAUP’s role in giving content to the term “tenure” and associated 
terms is twofold.  First, many faculty handbooks adopt the definitions of tenure 
and academic freedom derived from the landmark 1940 Statement of 
Principles and other AAUP policy documents as contractually enforceable 
institutional policy.  Some institutions do this by making specific references in 
their handbooks to the 1940 Statement of Principles; others do it by 
reproducing or paraphrasing the texts of pertinent AAUP policies.  Even in the 
absence of specific incorporation of AAUP terminology in institutional 
documents, ambiguities about contract terms can be resolved under principles 
of contract law by examining industrial “custom and usage,” and there is no 
doubt that AAUP tenure standards are widely recognized as institutional norms 
in American higher education.70 
B. The Commonly Understood Contractual Guarantees Associated with 
Tenure 
The 1940 Statement of Principles enumerates the essential requirements of 
academic tenure: 
 
 68. See Jones & Gold, supra note 4, at 212. 
 69. See, e.g., Moffie v. Oglethorpe Univ., Inc., 367 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); 
McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58, 62-3 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980); Rehor v. Case Western Reserve Univ., 331 N.E.2d 
416, 420 (Ohio 1975). 
 70. See generally Ralph S. Brown, Jr. & Matthew W. Finkin, The Usefulness of AAUP 
Policy Statements, 64 AAUP BULL. 5, 8 (1978).  For examples of the many instances in which 
courts have used AAUP policy statements as guidelines for interpreting institutional tenure 
policies, see, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1978); Browzin v. 
Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Karlen v. New York Univ., 464 F. 
Supp. 704, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Drans v. Providence College, 410 A.2d 992, 994 (R.I. 1980). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
68 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:51 
 A written contract of employment clearly setting forth the precise 
terms and conditions governing the appointment; 
 A probationary period of specified maximum length; 
 The notion that a term appointment cannot be non-renewed without 
providing a minimum notice period to the affected probationary 
faculty member; and 
 Minimum procedural standards for the termination of a tenured 
appointment for cause.71 
It also recognizes that, under certain circumstances, a tenured appointment 
may be terminated because of a financial exigency, a concept given content in 
other AAUP policy documents.72 
As already noted, a tenured faculty appointment can be terminated only for 
reasons and only in accordance with procedures that are specified as part of 
the contract and understood by the parties at the time they enter into the 
employment relationship.  Under the law of contracts, an institution of higher 
education owes legally enforceable obligations to tenured faculty members in 
those rare instances when it seeks to terminate a faculty appointment.  The 
institution owes the faculty member a legitimate reason for its action and a set 
of agreed-upon procedural protections before the termination is effected. 
1. Reasons Warranting Termination of Tenured Appointments 
A tenured appointment can be terminated only for reasons.  Under the 
AAUP’s definition of tenure and under the tenure policies at most institutions 
of higher education in this country, “reasons” sufficient to support the 
termination of a tenured appointment fall within two categories: “cause” and 
“reasons unrelated to cause.” 
a. Terminations for Cause 
Under AAUP policy, an institution is free to define for itself the standards 
constituting ground for for-cause termination, as long as those grounds 
“relat[e], directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in their 
professional capacities as teachers or researchers.”73  One of the most widely 
respected definitions of “adequate cause” was formulated almost thirty years 
 
 71. See 1940 Statement of Academic Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in 
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 4.  For a comprehensive review of 
academic due process, see Louis Joughin, Academic Due Process, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
573 (1963). 
 72. Financial exigency and the allied concept of program discontinuation are discussed infra 
Part III.B.1.b. 
 73. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 5(a), in 
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 26. 
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ago by the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education. Under that 
definition, adequate cause exists if the institution can show: 
(i) [D]emonstrated incompetence or dishonesty in teaching or research, 
(ii) [S]ubstantial and manifest neglect of duty, . . . [or] 
(iii) [P]ersonal conduct which substantially impairs the individual’s 
fulfillment of his [or her] institutional responsibilities.74 
Not only are these grounds narrow and highly qualified (e.g., 
“demonstrated incompetence” and “substantial and manifest neglect of duty”), 
but at most institutions the body hearing the charges and deciding the accused 
faculty member’s fate consists predominantly, or even wholly, of fellow 
faculty members—a potentially difficult forum before which to argue the 
institution’s case. 
b. Terminations Not for Cause 
AAUP policy recognizes three narrow circumstances in which a tenured 
faculty appointment may be terminated for reasons unrelated to the fitness of 
the faculty member.  These circumstances include financial exigency, program 
discontinuation, and institutional merger or affiliation. 
i. Financial exigency 
The 1940 Statement of Principles contains two passing references to 
financial exigency.  Without defining the term, the 1940 Statement of 
Principles provides that the service of a tenured faculty member can be 
terminated “only for adequate cause, except . . . under extraordinary 
circumstances because of financial exigency.”75  Five paragraphs later, it 
returns to the subject, stating that “[t]ermination of a continuous appointment 
because of financial exigency should be demonstrably bona fide.”76  It was not 
until the mid-1970s that the AAUP first devoted sustained attention to the 
meaning of financial exigency and the circumstances under which a financially 
troubled institution could invoke it as the justification for terminating tenured 
faculty appointments.77  In 1975, the AAUP comprehensively revised its 
 
 74. COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE, supra 
note 13, at 75. 
 75. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AAUP 
POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 4. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Financial Exigency, 62 AAUP BULL. 5 (1976).  “Most of the 
relevant policy formation [was] . . . first published in 1968.  When the test of Regulation 4 
seemed to need explanation . . . a major expansion on Regulation 4 got under way.  After 
Committee A and the council had twice overhauled it, the current version was first published 
in . . . 1975 . . . .” Id. at 6. 
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recommended institutional regulation on termination of faculty appointments.  
The revised regulation contained lengthy provisions on financial exigency and 
the related concept of program discontinuation.78  Almost immediately, courts 
looked to the AAUP definitions as the dispositive starting point for analysis of 
financially-inspired tenured terminations.79 
A tenured faculty appointment may be terminated if that is the only way 
for an institution to cope with a financial exigency, restrictively defined under 
AAUP policy as “an imminent financial crisis which threatens the survival of 
the institution as a whole and which cannot be alleviated by less drastic 
means.”80  The AAUP definition is, in the words of the AAUP’s expert on 
 
 78. See Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 4, 
in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23. 
 79. See, e.g., Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976); Browzin, 527 F.2d 843. 
  Lest there be any confusion, it is worth repeating an elementary truism under the law of 
contracts.  The AAUP’s standards on financial exigency and program discontinuation do not 
apply at a given college or university unless those standards have been incorporated by reference 
into the contractual employment relationship between institution and faculty member, for 
example, by appropriate reference in the faculty handbook or board-approved tenure policies.  
See, e.g., Linn v. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1989).  Few 
institutions have adopted the AAUP recommended institutional regulation in toto; in fact, not 
many institutions have adopted financial exigency standards in any form.  The importance of 
AAUP pronouncements in this area arises because the 1940 Statement of Principles incorporates 
the ambiguous reference to financial exigency.  Given the prominence of the 1940 Statement of 
Principles in defining the institutional common law of tenure, and given the deference courts pay 
to the 1940 Statement of Principles, a faculty member would be hard pressed to argue that a 
tenured faculty appointment could not be terminated on financial exigency grounds, just as an 
institution would be hard pressed to maintain that the AAUP’s definition of financial exigency 
would not be analytically useful in the absence of institution-endorsed alternative language.  See 
Krotkoff, 585 F.2d at 678 (noting that “[t]he national academic community’s understanding of the 
concept of tenure incorporates the notion that a college may refuse to renew a tenured teacher’s 
contract because of financial exigency so long as its action is demonstrably bona fide”). 
 80. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 
4(c)(1), in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23 (emphasis added). 
  The AAUP policies on financial exigency and program discontinuation are masterfully 
explained in an article by Professor Ralph Brown that appeared in ACADEME in early 1976.  
Professor Brown, a member of the faculty at Yale Law School, served for many years as the 
AAUP’s General Counsel and as a member of the Association’s Committee A on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure.  In 1975, the AAUP revised its recommended institutional regulations on 
financial exigency and program discontinuation, and Professor Brown’s 1976 article endeavors to 
explain the rationale for the AAUP policies and the meanings of key terms used in those policies.  
No article treats the AAUP’s approach to these controversial subjects more lucidly than this one.  
See Brown, supra note 77.  For other commentaries on the AAUP’s policies on financial 
exigency and program discontinuation, see David Fellman, The Association’s Evolving Policy on 
Financial Exigency, 70 ACADEME 14 (May-June 1984); Robert Charles Ludolph, Termination of 
Faculty Tenure Rights Due to Financial Exigency and Program Discontinuation, 63 U. DET. L. 
REV. 609 (1986). 
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financial exigency, Professor Ralph Brown, “an austere one.”81  Professor 
Brown continues: 
The Regulation is about termination of tenure appointments . . . . That is, it 
describes crisis circumstances when it becomes permissible to break contracts.  
This is a very serious thing to do, both as a matter of academic custom and of 
positive law.  So straight off . . . let us try to maintain the distinction between 
conditions that permit on the one hand the firing of teachers with tenure . . . 
and, on the other, a wide range of consequences that may fall under the milder 
term “retrenchment.”  Hard times may call for retrenchment; only a survival-
threatening crisis authorizes termination, as that word is used in the 1940 
Statement . . . .82 
The essence of financial exigency, then, as that term is used by the AAUP 
(and as many courts have held), is the notion of imminent institutional peril 
that can be alleviated only by terminating tenured faculty appointments.83  
While it is clear that the institutional governing board is entitled to declare 
financial exigency, and while courts will ordinarily defer to such declarations, 
it is also clear that courts will insist on objective indicia of bona fide financial 
distress, such as advance consultation with affected faculty governance 
organizations, efforts to place affected faculty members in other jobs, and 
observance of appropriate notice and severance-pay obligations.84 
ii. Program discontinuation 
Program discontinuation is a more controversial ground for terminating 
tenured appointments because it was not explicitly mentioned in the 1940 
Statement of Principles and has been skeptically viewed by some faculty 
members as the exception that could swallow up the general rule.  Under the 
AAUP’s recommended institutional regulations, a tenured faculty appointment 
may be terminated if the institution elects, for programmatic reasons not 
related to financial exigency, to discontinue a particular program or department 
of instruction.85  While the recommended AAUP policy is replete with 
 
 81. Brown, supra note 77, at 6. 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id.  See Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 
4(c)(1), in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23. 
 84. See, e.g., Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Faculty Dismissal Because of Enrollment 
Declines, 28 J. LAW & EDUC. 193, 195-99 (1999). 
 85. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 4(d), in 
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23.  Professor Brown observed that 
“[r]ecognition [of the ‘program discontinuation’ rationale] has developed independently, and 
without any explicit foundation in the 1940 Statement of Principles.  It is accepted as a fact of 
academic life that such events occur; and indeed it is healthy for the institution that they should.”  
Brown, supra note 77, at 13.  Some of the controversy surrounding the notion of program 
discontinuation owes its existence to the suspicion many faculty members have that 
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procedural limitations designed to narrow the circumstances under which a 
program can be discontinued with the resulting loss of tenured faculty 
positions,86 these limitations have not stopped institutions from reducing the 
ranks of tenured faculty members through highly controversial 
discontinuations of academic programs and departments.87 
iii. Institutional merger or affiliation 
Under narrowly defined circumstances, it is arguably consistent with 
AAUP policy for one institution to void the appointments of tenured faculty 
members as part of that institution’s merger into or affiliation with another.88 
2. Procedures for Tenure Termination 
A tenured faculty appointment can be terminated only in accordance with 
procedures that are specified as part of the contract, and understood by the 
parties at the time they enter into the employment relationship.  These 
procedures usually entail at a minimum: 
(a) A predetermination hearing before a body of faculty peers.  At this 
hearing, the faculty member is entitled to certain procedural rights, such as 
receipt of a written set of charges, assistance from an “advisor” (who can, 
but does not necessarily have to be an attorney), and a stenographic record 
of the proceedings; and 
(b) Deference to a suitable faculty role in institutional governance.  Standards 
for terminating appointments as well as procedures for hearings cannot be 
imposed unilaterally by administrators; they must be formulated with due 
regard for faculty primacy in all matters relating to faculty status.89 
 
“‘discontinuance’ may be invoked in hard times as a substitute, perhaps a subterfuge, for an 
exigency crisis that cannot be convincingly asserted.”  Id. 
 86. Under the AAUP’s Recommended Regulation 4(d), an institutional decision to 
discontinue a program must be based “essentially upon educational considerations, as determined 
primarily by the faculty . . . .”  The institution must make “every effort” to place a tenured faculty 
member in “another suitable position” instead of terminating the faculty member’s employment.  
If the faculty member requires retraining in order to perform other duties, then the institution is 
obliged to offer “financial and other support” for such training.  Faculty members who cannot be 
redeployed are entitled to “severance salary equitably adjusted to the faculty member’s length of 
past and potential service.”  Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, Reg. 4(d), in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 25. 
 87. See, e.g., Texas Faculty Ass’n v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 946 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 
1991); Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 88. See generally Report: On Institutional Mergers and Acquisitions, 68 ACADEME 1a 
(Mar.-Apr. 1982).  But cf. Gray v. Mundelein College, 695 N.E.2d 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), 
appeal denied, 705 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. 1998) (finding that a college and university did not intend for 
their affiliation to extinguish the college’s tenure obligations). 
 89. See generally 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, reprinted in 
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 179-85. 
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For at least six decades, since the formulation of the landmark 1940 
Statement of Principles, tenure has served the important end of protecting the 
academic freedom of faculty members.  Tenure bestows an appointment of 
indefinite duration that can be terminated only for specified reasons and in 
accordance with codified procedures assigning the principal fact-finding role to 
the faculty itself.  At the same time, however, our cursory exploration of the 
history of academic tenure in the United States reveals two peculiarities of 
particular relevance to the discussion of tenure’s relationship to compensation 
in contemporary academic medical centers. 
First, the contractual principle of tenure recognizes exceptions when 
tenure, for legitimate, bona fide reasons, becomes financially or 
programmatically unfeasible.  If an institution faces a financial crisis that 
threatens its existence as a whole and cannot, in the judgment of the governing 
board, be alleviated through means less drastic than the termination of tenured 
faculty appointments, or if for programmatic reasons the board determines to 
discontinue a particular program of instruction, then under those circumstances 
it is appropriate to terminate the appointments of tenured faculty members. 
Second, even though the 1940 Statement of Principles contains a passing 
reference to “economic security” as a second justification for the institution of 
tenure, it is fair to say that between 1940 and 1996 little deference was given to 
that phrase by the AAUP, scholars of the history of tenure, or by the courts.90  
If an academic medical center can terminate tenured faculty appointments in 
the event of a financial exigency or the discontinuation of a program or 
department, thereby reducing the salaries of affected faculty members all the 
way to zero, it is not too much to suggest that the same event would logically 
justify less restrictive steps such as reductions in salary.  For example, a two-
year college in Maryland reacted to massive state and county budget cuts by 
eliminating academic programs and terminating the appointments of tenured 
faculty members in those programs.91  Faculty members argued that the college 
had no legal right to terminate programs prior to the declaration of an 
institution-threatening financial exigency.92  The Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals disagreed: “The actions taken by the College were designed to avoid 
the necessity of declaring an ‘exigency.’  They were, nonetheless, indicative of 
 
 90. While some commentators and economists concentrated on the financial underpinnings 
of the tenure system, see, e.g., Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, Tenure Issues in 
Higher Education, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1999), few made any effort to plumb the analytic link 
between tenure and the “economic security” language in the 1940 Statement of Principles.  For 
one elegant exception, see Ann H. Franke, Tenure and the Faculty Pocketbook, 81 ACADEME 108 
(Mar.-Apr. 1995). 
 91. See Board of Community College Trustees v. Adams, 701 A.2d 1113 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1997). 
 92. Id. at 1139-40. 
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attempts to resolve the present and anticipated financial shortfalls in order to 
solve the financial problems without the necessity of taking that last step.”93 
In sum, the history of academic tenure in the United States sheds little light 
on the relationship between tenure and compensation.  The best that can be 
said is that tenure does not provide protection against the loss of academic 
employment due to financial exigency or the discontinuation of academic 
programs.  If contemporary academic medical centers confront financial 
distress of sufficient acuity to cause multi-million-dollar deficits and at least 
one bankruptcy filing, to what extent are they justified, as a matter of contract 
law, in adopting new compensation paradigms for tenured faculty?  The AAUP 
turned its attention to that question only recently. 
In early 1996, a subcommittee of the AAUP’s Committee A on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure drafted a thoughtful report entitled Tenure in the Medical 
School.94  Although this report was published for comment in the January-
February, 1996 edition of ACADEME, it was never formally adopted as an 
expression of official AAUP policy.  The report represents the individual 
views of some of the AAUP’s most enlightened and experienced members on 
the changing meaning of tenure in academic health care centers. 
The report is remarkable in several respects.  It candidly acknowledges the 
many ways in which medical schools differ from other university programs, 
including the emphasis on bottom-line business concerns and the “individual 
entrepreneurial activities” in which faculty members must engage in order to 
underwrite portions of their own salaries.95  Observing that “[t]he situation has 
become much more complex since the time of the 1940 Statement of 
Principles,” the report addresses the sensitive issue of compensation reductions 
for tenured clinical faculty members.96  The report suggests “using a basic 
science salary line as a guidepost for determining salary guarantees for clinical 
faculty members,” and specifically endorses other “[c]reative approaches” to 
faculty compensation as long as such approaches are “not overtly at odds with 
existing Association policy.”97  While it is a bit unclear what the report means 
by a “basic science salary line,” the report seems to suggest that compensation 
reductions, even drastic reductions, for tenured clinicians are tolerable so long 
as the reduced salary is not less than a benchmark pegged in some disciplined 
fashion to salaries of tenured basic science faculty members.98 
 
 93. Id. at 1140 (emphasis added). 
 94. Report: Tenure in the Medical School, 82 ACADEME 40 (Jan.-Feb. 1996). 
 95. Id. at 42. 
 96. Id. at 43 n.11. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. See Report: Tenure in the Medical School, supra note 94, at 42-44. 
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IV. LITIGATION INVOLVING COMPENSATION FOR TENURED FACULTY 
MEMBERS 
In litigation involving the construction and interpretation of employment 
contracts, courts adhere to the so-called “objective law of contracts” under 
which the parties’ contract rights are determined in the first instance by 
examining the written language in the contract.99  A faculty member alleging 
breach of contract bears the initial burden of identifying the contract term that 
would allegedly be violated if the university reduced his or her salary. 
In contrast to some other fields, in which the principal terms of the 
employment relationship are routinely reduced to an integrated contract of 
employment, the contract by which faculty members are employed exists in a 
non-integrated form.  As one court indicated: “[I]n construing contracts of 
employment in a university setting, we follow the instruction that such 
employment contracts ‘comprehend as essential parts of themselves the hiring 
policies and practices of the University as embodied in its employment 
regulations and customs.’”100 
In the relatively few cases in which faculty members have sought to link 
tenure to compensation, most involve claims by administrators or department 
chairs that they were entitled to retain their administrator’s stipend when they 
returned to full-time faculty status -- a situation factually and legally distinct 
from the tenure rights of medical school faculty members whose compensation 
is reduced for financial reasons.101 
In the first reported case involving a medical school faculty member’s 
compensation, an academic medical center reduced the salary of a tenured 
 
 99. See, e.g., Patel v. Howard Univ., 896 F. Supp. 199 (D.D.C. 1995) (enunciating the 
general principle that a court “adheres to the ‘objective law of contracts,’” whereby the “written 
language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties 
. . . .” (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 967 (D.C. 1984))). 
 100. Best, 484 A.2d at 967 (quoting Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 
1969)).  Accord, Bason v. American Univ., 414 A.2d 522, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Pride v. Howard 
Univ., 384 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 101. See, e.g., Franken v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 714 P.2d 1308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); 
Barde v. Board of Trustees of Reg’l Community Colleges, 539 A.2d 1000 (Conn. 1988); 
Tuckman v. Florida State Univ., 530 So.2d 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Kirsner v. University 
of Miami, 362 So.2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 367 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 1979); 
Janos v. University of Wash., 851 P.2d 683 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).  But see Sorlie v. School Dist. 
No. 2, 667 P.2d 400 (Mont. 1983); Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194 
(Mont. 1981).  Sorlie and Keiser arguably stand for the proposition that tenure protects faculty 
members from reductions in salary.  Franken, however, distinguished Keiser on the ground that it 
involved the unusual instance of a faculty member who was “tenured as an administrator.”  The 
Franken court refused to apply Keiser when a faculty member was tenured “only as a professor” 
and held an administrative position “at will” -- which, of course, describes the situation at most 
institutions.  Franken, 714 P.2d at 1310.  It is fair to describe the Keiser holding as an aberration 
that has commanded little adherence in other courts and other contexts. 
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faculty member who did not generate as much grant money as expected.102  
The faculty member brought suit on the ground that the salary reduction 
violated his tenure rights.103  The court rejected his claim, holding that a 
university has “a significant interest in having reasonable discretion to 
administer its educational programs.”104  Moreover, the court continued,  “the 
strength of that interest gives schools leeway in making broad budget decisions 
that may affect only a few employees.”105 
Klinge v. Ithaca College posed the issue of whether tenure insulated a 
faculty member from salary reduction.106  The plaintiff, a tenured full professor 
at a private college in New York State, was demoted and had his salary 
reduced.  The professor reluctantly accepted his demotion but sued for breach 
of contract on the ground that, as a tenured faculty member, his salary could 
not be reduced.  The court concluded that the college had the contractual right 
to reduce a tenured faculty member’s salary by stating that “[c]learly, no 
college is required to perpetuate . . . salaries and benefits each year, simply 
because the incumbent is tenured . . . .”107 
In the last two years, several lawsuits and grievances have been filed 
challenging efforts by academic medical centers to revise compensation 
policies for tenured faculty members.  To date, none of these legal challenges 
has led to a court decision establishing a link between tenure and protection 
against salary reduction. 
On July 20, 1998, a California trial court rendered a preliminary ruling in 
Albrecht v. University of Southern California.108  In 1995, the School of 
Medicine at the University of Southern California (“School”), in an effort to 
address what administrators referred to as a “structural deficit” in the School, 
 
 102. Williams v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 6 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1194 (1994). 
 103. Id. at 292. 
 104. Id. at 293.  See also Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565 (1975); Texas Faculty Ass’n v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 946 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 
1991). 
 105. Williams, 6 F.3d at 293.  See also Texas Faculty Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 379. 
 106. Klinge v. Ithaca College, 167 Misc. 2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff’d in pertinent part, 
652 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 107. Klinge, 167 Misc. 2d at 463.  Cf. UDC Chairs Ch., Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. 
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of D.C., 56 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  For many years, the UDC 
had an unwritten practice of supplementing the salaries of department chairs (all of whom were 
on nine-month academic contracts) by hiring them for three-month summer appointments.  But in 
the spring of 1992, in response to reduced funding from the Government of the District of 
Columbia and depletion of its cash reserves, the University announced that department chairs 
would no longer be employed in the summers.  Thirty-three chairs filed suit alleging that they had 
been deprived of customary summer employment without due process.  A unanimous panel of the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the chairs’ claim that tenure protected them from 
reductions in annual compensation.  56 F.3d at 1470. 
 108. No. BC160860 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 20, 1998). 
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sent a form letter to all tenured members of the basic science faculty.  The 
form letter notified each faculty member that the School intended to implement 
certain unilateral changes in the standard-form faculty appointment letter, 
including a shortened employment term (from twelve to nine months), a 
concomitant reduction of twenty-five percent in each faculty member’s annual 
compensation, reductions in vacation time, the elimination or reduction of 
other fringe benefits, and the implementation of new “productivity standards” 
by which to determine compensation in future years.109  In late 1996, all the 
tenured basic scientists filed suit for breach of contract.  Their lawsuit alleged, 
among other things, that the School’s unilateral implementation of these 
changes violated their contract rights, including provisions in the faculty 
handbook that incorporated the “economic security” language in the 1940 
Statement of Principles.110 
The court threw out major portions of the lawsuit.  The court ruled that 
“economic security” was too vague to rise to the level of an enforceable 
contractual obligation: 
A promise is not enforceable unless it is sufficiently definite to allow a court to 
determine the scope of any duty created by the promise.  Promises that are not 
sufficiently certain to be enforced and which improperly impose on the court 
the burden of making financial decisions cannot support a breach of contract 
action. . . . During oral argument, the court inquired of plaintiffs’ position as to 
the meaning of the [“economic security” language in the faculty handbook] 
and the scope of the duty it allegedly creates.  The response involved a vague 
claim that plaintiffs are entitled to pay parity. . . . [T]he [tenure] contract is 
unenforceable as a matter of law if interpreted in the manner advanced by 
plaintiffs.111 
Just a few days earlier, in Kirschenbaum v. Northwestern University, 112 an 
Illinois trial court rejected the salary claims of a tenured Northwestern 
University Medical School faculty member.  The plaintiff, a tenured clinical 
psychologist, alleged that his tenure rights were violated by a Medical School 
salary policy (known as the “zero-based salary policy”) that required tenured 
faculty members to generate sufficient extramural funding from patient 
revenues or grants to defray one hundred percent of their salaries.113  The 
plaintiff argued that, by virtue of the “economic security” provision in the 1940 
 
 109. See id.  See generally Alfred G. Kildow, Medical School Faculty to Prompt a Vigorous 
USC Defense (last modified Dec. 5, 1996) <http:www.usc.edu/ext-relations/news_service/chroni 
cle_html> (click  on “1996.12.02.html”). 
 110. See Albrecht, No. BC160860, slip op. at 1-2. 
 111. Id. at 2, 3. 
 112. No. 93-CH-8206 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 17, 1998), aff’d, No. 1-98-3059 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 29, 
1999). 
 113. The Appellate Court of Illinois provides a detailed history of this case and the relevant 
contract provisions.  See Kirschenbaum, No. 1-98-3059, slip op. at 1-18. 
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Statement of Principles, he was entitled to be paid by the University even in 
the absence of external funding support.114  In a caustic decision, the trial judge 
disagreed: “[T]enure itself, for medical school faculty, as a status, does not as a 
matter of law require as a necessary incident thereof the payment of an annual 
salary from university sources.”115  The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision, finding that the “documents comprising the contract” awarded 
the plaintiff tenure “for an indefinite period with no financial obligation on 
Northwestern’s part.”116 
Albrecht and Kirschenbaum are anomalous factually and are of limited 
precedential significance; however, the two decisions manifest, at a minimum, 
some level of judicial hostility to the kinds of objections tenured medical 
school faculty members are making at many institutions in the face of 
productivity-based compensation policies. 
V. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
We are not far enough into the era of faculty litigation over medical school 
compensation policies to know for certain whether the reaction of the courts in 
Albrecht and Kirschenbaum is a harbinger of judicial resistance to the 
argument by faculty plaintiffs that medical schools cannot lower the salaries of 
tenured faculty members to cope with financial hard times.  We can 
nevertheless discern some practical lessons. 
First and most important, the link between tenure and academic freedom is 
venerable and well established; the link between tenure and economic security 
is more tenuous.  Over the last sixty years, the academic-freedom rights of 
college and university faculty members have been exhaustively plumbed in 
treatises, court decisions, and AAUP policy statements.  Their right to 
“economic security” is vaguer and more enigmatic.  We instinctively 
 
 114. See Kirschenbaum, No. 93-CH-8206, slip op. at 2. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 35-36. 
  The most recent faculty lawsuit was instituted in early 1999 by a group of faculty 
members from Georgetown University School of Medicine.  See Glazer v. Georgetown Univ., 
Civ. A. No. 321-99 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 1999).  The faculty in Glazer challenged the 
implementation of a productivity-based compensation policy for medical school faculty members.  
The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the policy violated their contract rights as tenured 
faculty members and breached fiduciary obligations owed to the faculty by the President and the 
Board of Directors.  See id.  In the spring of 1999, the lawsuit was settled.  According to an article 
dated May 28, 1999 in ACADEME TODAY, an online version of the CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION, the university agreed to withdraw the compensation policy, supplement the grants of 
two faculty members who had rededicated grant monies to cover salary shortfalls, and pay the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.  See Georgetown U. Settles Medical Professors’ Lawsuit Over Pay 
Policy, ACADEME TODAY  <http://www.chronicle.com>.  See also Andy Amend, GU Rescinds 
Med Center Pay Policy, THE HOYA, Feb. 26, 1999 (visited Jan. 19, 2000) 
<http://www.thehoya.com/news/022699/news1.htm>. 
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understand (even in the absence of controlling case law) that economic-
security rights would be jeopardized if a college or university ordered either 
mercilessly large or patently unwarranted salary cuts for tenured faculty 
members.  But as the AAMC’s analysis shows, compensation policies adopted 
in the last few years at many of the nation’s academic medical centers are 
neither extreme nor unwarranted.  They guarantee tenured faculty members 
generous salaries by comparison to academic salaries in the arts and sciences, 
and they are being implemented by medical schools facing the specter of 
indisputable, gaping, and in some instances worsening deficits. 
As those who have endured it will be the first to attest, tenure litigation 
produces few winners.  It leaves anger, resentment, and financial tribulation in 
its wake.  It represents, in a sense, the failure of what one perceptive observer 
has called the “social contract” on which the tenure system is bottomed.117  As 
financial conditions at the nation’s medical schools worsen in the next five 
years, the leaders of the academic medical community will be under renewed 
pressure to reduce faculty payrolls.  Academic tenure does not pose an 
insuperable obstacle to the achievement of that goal, but we can learn from the 
thirty years of experience the courts have had with an allied concept – financial 
exigency – to discern some common-sense principles to protect against the 
erosion of tenure. 
Just as the AAUP, in its recommended institutional regulation on financial 
exigency, insists on certain substantive and procedural safeguards to protect 
the academic freedom of faculty members when financial constraints require 
the abrogation of tenured faculty appointments, so too can an academic 
medical center that needs to modify its compensation standards for tenured 
 
 117. In Henry Rosovsky’s words: 
For me, the essence of academic tenure lies in . . . [the notion of] tenure as social 
contract: an appropriate and essential form of social contract in universities.  It is 
appropriate because the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.  It is essential because 
the absence of tenure would, in the long run, lower the quality of a faculty.  And faculty 
quality is the keystone of university life.  The best faculty will attract the ablest students, 
produce the finest alumni, generate the most research support, and so on . . . . 
 
Our jobs—as senior professors at major universities—require high intelligence, special 
talents, and initiative.  These attributes are in general demand: business, law, medicine, 
and other professions are looking for people with similar characteristics.  And some of 
these careers promise, at considerable risk, far greater financial rewards . . . . 
 
In my view, tenure carries the implication of joining an extended family; that is the social 
contract.  Each side can seek a divorce: the university only in the most extraordinary 
circumstances, and the professor as easily as a male under Islamic law.  It is not an 
uneven bargain because the university needs its share of talented people, and professors 
trade life-long security and familial relations for lesser economic rewards. 
HENRY ROSOVSKY, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 183-84 (1990). 
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faculty members incorporate safeguards designed to protect tenure and 
academic freedom.  Among these safeguards would be the following. 
The justification for changes in compensation policy should be explained 
to affected faculty members. 
Faculty members, through their elected representatives and governing 
organizations, should be involved in the formulation of academic policies 
affecting tenure and compensation. 
Compensation standards should be formula-based, to the maximum extent 
possible, to avoid the appearance that individual compensation determinations 
are being made for punitive reasons or for reasons that could implicate 
academic freedom concerns. 
In keeping with principles associated with financial exigency, 
compensation reductions for tenured faculty members should be considered 
only when other means of staunching operating deficits have been 
implemented.  Faculty compensation reductions should not be the first resort. 
“[A] system of tenure, properly applied, is a guarantor of educational 
quality.”118  As academic medicine confronts the challenges of the next 
century, the tenure system will be tested as never before.  It will endure and be 
strengthened if faculty appreciate the extraordinary gravity of the financial 
threats to academic medicine and administrators honor their obligations to 




 118. Report: Tenure in the Medical School, supra note 94, at 45. 
